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COMMON LAW EXCEPTIONS TO COMPETITIVE BIDDING
REQUIREMENTS IN PUBLIC CONTRACTS
INTRODUCTION
The field of public contract law has been a subject of increasing in-
terest in recent years, which is understandable when one notes the ever-
increasing impact of governmental procurement upon the economy.
The real glamor has been in the area of federal procurement, but the
significance of state and local public contract law should not be dis-
counted.' The purpose here will be to examine one aspect of public
contract law: the common law exceptions to competitive bidding re-
quirements in state and local contracts. But before examining these ex-
ceptions it is necessary to examine the essentials of competitive bidding.
PERSPECTIVE
The requirement of competitive bidding may be broadly defined as
that procedure whereby after a formal advertisement for bids, con-
tract proposals are submitted to a public authority which after due
deliberation is authorized either to reject all bids, or to award the con-
tract to the lowest responsible bidder.2 It is said that competitive bidding
in the letting of public contracts is employed for the protection of the
public from fraud, favoritism, and corruption and to secure to the pub-
lic the fruits of competition among bidders.' As to this requirement
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has said:
Such salutary safeguards are upon occasion vividly necessary to
protect the public from officials at times forgetful of their city's
1. In fiscal 1965, Virginia alone spent some 805 million dollars, much of it under
public contract. TAX FOUNDATION, FACTS AND FIGURES ON GOVERNMENT FINANCES 225
(1967). Federal procurement law, which is generally governed by the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947 (ASPA), 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2314 (1964), as well as the
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 40 U.S.C. §§ 471-524, 41
U.S.C. §§ 251-260 (1964), will be mentioned only by way of comparison. The Armed
Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR), issued under authority of the ASPA,
are the main body of law in federal procurement. 32 C.F.R. § 1.101 et seq. [Herein-
after cited as ASPR.]
2. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.28 (rev. ed. 1966).
3. Edward v. Renton, 67 Wash. 2d 598, 409 P.2d 153 (1965); Fonder v. South Sioux
Falls, 76 S.D. 31, 71 N.W. 2d 618 (1955).
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interest. Otherwise a contract on disastrous terms could be let at
will to a favored contractor who, in the event that it was after-
wards questioned, might still demand pay for work done.4
But in the absence of controlling constitutional, statutory, or charter
provisions, competitive bidding is not an essential prerequisite to the
letting of public contracts. 5 Nor need a public authority let its con-
tracts to the lowest bidder if, in the absence of statutory requirement, it
nonetheless adopts a policy of advertising for bids.6 But when competi-
tive bidding is required by ordinance it must be followed by successor
authorities.7
However, where competitive bidding is required by constitution,
statute, or charter, it is mandatory; and any contract awarded without
complying with the requirement is void and unenforceable.8 Thus strict
compliance with competitive bidding requirements is a condition pre-
cedent to the awarding of the contract?
Competitive bidding requirements apply as well to supplemental con-
tracts, that is, contracts covering items not provided for by the terms
of the original contract and not merely incidental to the contract al-
ready awarded, unless bids for the original contract were made on the
basis of a contemplated extension under supplemental contracts to be
let to the original successful bidder.10 Such requirements also apply to
amendments of a contract already executed in compliance therewith
where the amendments alter the original contract in some vital and
4. Bristol v. Dominion Nae'l Bank, 153 Va. 71, 84, 149 S.E. 632, 635 (1929).
5. South Hampton Apts. v. Eliz. City County, 185 Va. 67, 37 S.E.2d 841 (1946);
Schulte v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 292, 10 P.2d 625 (1932).
6. Davis v. Santa Ana, 108 Cal. App. 2d 669, 239 P.2d 656 (1952); Slocum v. Medford,
302 Mass. 251, 18 N.E. 2d 1013 (1939).
7. Cimarron Utilities v. Guymon, 171 Okla. 344, 43 P.2d 143 (1935); Kirksville v.
Harrington, 225 Mo. App. 309, 35 S.W. 2d 614 (1930); Flinn v. Philadelphia, 258 Pa.
355, 102 A. 24 (1917).
8. Miller v. McKinnon, 20 Cal. 2d 83, 124 P.2d 34 (1946); 1 ArmTIAu, MUNrICPAL
CoRpoRATioN LAw § 10.11 (1967).
9. Fineran v. Bitulithic Paving Co, 116 Ky. 495, 76 S.W. 415 (1903). It is not nec-
essary in order to establish the invalidity of a contract for failure to comply with
competitive bidding requirements to show fraud or other affirmative wrongdoing.
Coller v. St. Paul, 223 Minn. 376, 26 N.W. 2d 835 (1947). And a failure to observe
the statutory requirement is not excused by the fact that the only competitors would
have necessarily incurred a much larger expense in execution of the work than the
one who secured the contract. Philadelphia Co. v. Pittsburgh, 253 Pa. 147, 97 A. 1083
(1916).
10. Brevilacqua v. Clark, 377 Pa. 1, 103 A.2d 661 (1954); 63 CJ.S. Municipal Corpo-
rations § 996(b) (2) (1950).
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essential particular, and this is so notwithstanding a clause giving the
public authority a right to modify without supplemental bidding."
When a contract which was originally let upon competitive bidding is
abandoned, the public authority may proceed to complete the work
without again advertising for bids, the theory being that the original
contractor has made himself liable for the extra expense incurred.'2
It has been mentioned previously that at common law competitive
bidding is not an essential prerequisite to the letting of public contracts.
As such statutes are contrary to the common law, they are subject to
the rule of strict construction. 13 It is not remarkable, then, that there
has grown up a body of case law dictating certain exceptions to such
requirements and independent of any statutory distinctions. Thus we
may say that there is a common law of exceptions, stemming from the
tendency of the courts to construe bid statutes strictly in close cases.
These exceptions are: contracts requiring special skills, contracts made
under public exigency, contracts specifying unique items, contracts for
purchase of utility services, and contracts requiring patented items. In
some instances these exceptions have been embodied into statutes on
the state and local level.' 4
CONTRACTS REQUIRING SPECIAL SKILLS
Constitutional, statutory, or charter provisions requiring competitive
bidding as a basis for entering into contractual relations with a public
authority are not intended to apply to contracts for personal services
requiring special skill or training." Thus contracts with accountants,
actors, architects, artists, attorneys, auditors, abstractors, engineers,
11. Cullingham v. Omaha, 143 Neb. 744, 10 N.W.2d 615 (1943).
12. Moriarity v. Orange County, 90 N.J.L. 328, 98 A. 465 (1916). Statutes requir-
ing competitive bidding on public improvements are applicable only to contracts
whereby the public authority itself assumes obligations or indebtedness and are thus
not applicable to projects financed by revenue bonds. Wring v. Jefferson, 413 S.W.
2d 292 (Mo. 1967); Massey v. Franklin, 384 SV.2d 505 (Ky. 1964).
13. Fonder v. South Sioux Falls, 76 S.D. 31, 71 N.W. 2d 618 (1955); Griswold v.
Ramsey County, 242 Minn. 529, 65 N.W.2d 647 (1954).
14. In federal procurement these exceptions are recognized in the seventeen ex-
ceptions to formal advertising under the ambit of which each negotiated procurement
must come. ASPR § 3.200 et. seq.
15. Ex parte Houston, 224 P.2d 281, 295 (Okla. Grim. App. 1950); Ports v. Utica,
86 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1937); Commonwealth v. Tice, 272 Pa. 447, 116 A. 316 (1922);
Miller v. Boyle, 43 Cal. App. 39, 184 P. 421 (1919); Braaten v. Olsen, 28 N.D. 235,
148 N.W. 829 (1914).
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clerks, interior decorators, musicians, stenographers, and surveyors have
been held exempt from competitive bidding requirements. 6
The most widely accepted rationale for this exception is that, if con-
tracts for this type of work must be let to the lowest bidder, the in-
evitable result would place the public in a position which would require
it to accept the services of incompetent persons who are lacking in such
special skills or training since they would be able to underbid those more
talented as the natural result of competitive pressures."'
The earlier cases on this point relied on the view that contracts for
professional services were not intended to be included in the terms
"work, materials, and labor" included in so many statutes and charters.'8
This was unfortunate since it forced the courts to follow the tenuous
route of interpreting legislative intent, which is certainly a rather
circuitous method to reach the salutary results dictated by the weight
of authority. A recent case, however, has found a more cogent ra-
tionale, holding that because discretion is involved in the selection of
the ones to perform personal services requiring special skill, public con-
tracts for such services are not the subject of competitive bidding.9
To come within the special skills exception, the contract must be
for services that are personal. Thus in Johnson-Olmstead Realty v. Den-
ver it was held that a contract between a city and a cooperative as-
sociation of architects to furnish architectural services was invalid be-
cause of noncompliance with competitive bidding requirements. Here
the city had delegated its rights to select an architect to an association
inherently impersonal; the reason for validating the contract under the
exception had failed. Further, for a contract to fall within the exception,
it must require some peculiar skill. Thus it has been held that a con-
tract between a city and an individual for the maintenance and collec-
tion of monies from parking meters does not fall within the exception.21
16. Annot., 44 A.L.R. 1150 (1926).
17. Parker v. Panama City, 151 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1963); Hellman v. St. Louis County,
302 S.W.2d 911 (Mo. 1957); Hordin v. Cleveland, 77 Ohio App. 491, 62 N.E. 2d 889
(1945). The exception for personal and professional services has been recognized in
federal procurement, ASPR § 3.204-1, and there is some indication that this exception
is recognized in Virginia. Newport News v. Potter, 112 F. 321, 331 (4th Cir. 1903).
18. See, People ex. rel. Smith v. Flagg, 17 N.Y. 584 (1858). Accord, Delker v. At-
lantic, 90 N.J.L. 473, 101 A. 370 (1917).
19. Masters v. Pack, 215 Tenn. 629, 288 S.W.2d 144 (1965).
20. 89 Colo. 250, 1 P.2d 928 (1931); accord, Franklin v. Horton, 97 N.J.L. 25, 116
A. 176 (1922); O'Brien v. Niagara Falls, 65 Misc. 92, 119 N.Y.S. 497 (1909).
21. Pensacola v. Kirby, 47 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1950). See also, Terry v. Cookeville, 184
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It is apparent that the special skills exception is premised upon a basic
economic fact, and when recognized as such, serves to adapt public
bidding procedures to the parameters of the marketplace.
CONTRACTS MADE UNDER PUBLIC EXIGENCY
An emergency has been defined as an unforeseen occurrence or
combination of circumstances which call for an immediate action or
remedy.22 When such a condition exists, requirements for competitive
bidding are dispensed with.2" Ratio cessante cessit lex. Thus where a
city manager ordered necessary repairs to an installation in a municipal
utility without soliciting competitive bids for such repairs, and it ap-
peared that an emergency existed, the governing body had the power
to approve the contract.2 4
The exception, however, does not apply to a condition which may
clearly be foreseen in abundant time to take remedial action before
serious damage to the health or safety of persons or property is likely
to occur. Thus projects which display so imminent a need that normal
procedures may be dispensed with must result from a sudden or unex-
pected occurrence or exhibit a new condition calling for immediate
action.25 Also, it has been held that where the making of emergency
repairs is only incidental to a principal contract let without competitive
bidding where such is required, the contract is void. 6
Under a provision to that effect, a determination of emergency made
by a public authority is a condition precedent to the letting of a con-
tract without submitting it to competitive bidding,27 but where such de-
termintaion has been made, it is subject to collateral attack in the
courts. 8 Similarly, where a statute creates an emergency exception and
Tenn. 347, 198 S.W.2d 1010 (1947); Cleveland v. Lausche, 71 Ohio App. 273, 49 N.E.2d
207 (1943).
22. Oakes v. Peter Pan Bakers, 138 N.W.2d 93, 100 (Ia. 1965); Pickett v. Cooper,
202 Va. 60, 116 S.E.2d 48 (1960).
23. Hoffman v. Mt. Pleasant, 126 Tex. 632, 89 S.W.2d 193 (1936); Tobin v. Sundance,
45 Wyo. 219, 17 P.2d 666 (1933); Los Angeles Dred. Co. v. Long Beach, 210 Cal. 348,
291 P. 839 (1930); Sheehan v. New York, 37 Misc. 432, 75 N.Y.S. 802 (1902).
24. Merchant's Nat'l Bank v. Grand Forks, 130 N.W.2d 212 (N.D. 1964). This ex-
ception is recognized in federal procurement. ASPR § 3.202-1 et. seq.
25. Bd. of Education v. Hoek, 38 N.J. 213, 183 A.2d 633 (1962).
26. Smith v. Vinton, 216 La. 9, 43 So. 2d 18 (1949).
27. West Va. Coal Co. v. St. Louis, 324 Mo. 968, 25 S.W.2d 466 (1930); Tobin v.
Sundance, 45 Wyo. 219, 17 P.2d 666 (1933).
28. Raynor v. Louisburg, 220 N.C. 348, 17 S.E.2d 495 (1941); Continental Constr.
Co. v. Lawrence, 297 Mass. 513, 9 N.E.2d 550 (1937).
[Vol. 10: 228
COMPETITIVE BIDDING REQUIREMENTS
-does not confer express power on the public authority to declare an
emergency, the authority cannot declare an emergency where none
exists so as to defeat the provisions of the law.29
The emergency exception is based on the recognition of a special fact
situation and serves to provide a necessary flexibility to the require-
ments of competitive bidding when strict compliance with statutory
provisions would be unavailing.
CONTRACTS SPECIFYING UNIQUE ITEMS
The object of requiring competitive bidding is, of course, to insure
economy and exclude favoritism and corruption. But such a require-
ment is futile in cases where the public authority desires to obtain a
particular or unique property, be it personalty or realty. In such cases
it has been held that the requirement is inapplicable as it may be said
to apply only to articles which are sold and consumed generally.30
Thus a public contract for the purchase of a particular steamboat
was valid without submission to competitive bidding,31 and in the ab-
sence of fraud, favoritism, or corruption, it was not illegal for a public
authority to include in its contract specification features of a particular
diesel engine which it felt desirable.2 Further, it was held in Schwartz
v. Bd. of Freeholders that a public authority may specify a particular
brand in its specifications 3 Here it was intimated, however, that where
a particular brand is specified, the phrase "or equal" should be added.4
That at common law all realty is regarded as being unique should be
sufficient justification for its inclusion within this exception, but a re-
cent case, Hickey v. Burke,3 5 provided another rationale. Here it was
held the state under its police power (or any agency thereof by statute)
is not required to enter into competitive bidding when specific realty
is needed as it has the right of pre-emption in the exercise of its power
of eminent domain.
29. Scatuorchio v. Jersey City, 14 N.J. 72, 100 A.2d 869 (1953).
30. Leaman & Reynolds v. Housing Auth., 159 So.2d 365 (La. App. 1964); Ambrozich
v. Eveleth, 200 Minn. 473, 274 NAV. 635 (1937).
31. Boone v. Cook, 365 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1963).
32. Otter Trail Power Co. v. MacKichan, 270 Minn. 262, 133 N.W.2d 511 (1965).
33. 6 NJ. Super. 79, 69 A.2d 885 (1949).
34. The use of brand names in federal procurement is limited to those instances in
which an adequate specification or more detailed description cannot be supplied, and
where brand names are used, the phrase "or equal" is required. ASPR § 1.1206-1
et. seq.
35. 78 Ohio App. 351, 69 N.E.2d 33 (1946).
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Another facet of this exception is that line of authority holding that
contracts for printing advertisements for bids are not within competitive
bidding requirements, since contracts which require previous advertise-
ment manifestly cannot be contracts for that very advertisement.", In
short, a public authority need not advertise to advertise. The uniqueness
lies not in the article, but in the particular fact situation.
Here again an aberration in pure competition is given tacit recogni-
tion in this exception for unique items. This common law recognition
of economic realities promotes a salutary result.
CONTRACTS FOR PURCHASE OF UTILITY SERVICES
There is a conflict of authority on the applicability of competitive
bidding requirements to contracts for the furnishing of such items of
public utility as water, gas, and electricity. The majority view is that
such requirements have no applicability to a contract between a public
authority and a utility company37 The oldest rationale for this view
is that such contracts are not for "work, materials, or supplies" within
the contemplation of statutory or charter provisions.3s
A second view is that since ordinarily there is only one concern serv-
ing the area which is in a position to bid on the contract, it would be
a useless practice in most cases to submit such a contract to the rigors
of competitive bidding.39 The broadness of this approach lends it to
much abuse when it is applied to fact situations differing from that
posited.
Perhaps the best reasoned rationale is that since the state or the mu-
nicipality itself has the power to fix the price of the service to be ren-
dered or of the commodity to be furnished, this fact alone affords ade-
quate protection to the public interest. 40
Perhaps the most that can be said of the courts supporting the mi-
nority view (that contracts for the purchase of utility services must be
36. See, e.g., Doeker v. Atlantic County, 90 N.J.L. 473, 101 A. 370 (1917); Public
Ledger v. Memphis, 93 Tenn. 77, 23 S.W. 51 (1893).
37. Washington Fruit & Produce Co. v. Yakima, 3 Wash.2d 152, 100 P.2d 8 (1940);
Hartford v. Hartford E. L. Co., 65 Conn. 324, 32 A. 925 (1895).
38. Arnhold v. Klug, 97 Kan. 576, 155 P. 1085 (1916); Gleason v. Dalton, 28 App.
Div. 555, 51 N.Y.S. 337 (1898). The defects of this type of approach to the problem
are discussed in a preceding section of this paper.
39. Washington Fruit & Produce Co. v. Yakima, 3 Wash. 2d 152, 100 P.2d 8 (1940);
Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co. v. Los Angeles, 188 Cal. 307, 205 P. 125 (1922).
40. Mullen v. Louisburg, 225 N.C. 53, 33 S.E.2d 484 (1945); Mutual Electric Co.
v. Pomeroy, 99 Ohio St. 75, 124 N.E. 58 (1918).
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let on competitive bidding) is that their attitude has a certain historical
interest in that it approaches that of the eighteenth century English
courts in its rigidity. Their view is that since competitive bidding re-
quirements are mandatory, there are no exceptions.
4 1
The reason that the holding that competitive bidding req.uirements
have no applicability to contracts for the purchase of utility services in
the majority view is that its logical basis rests upon an economic fact.
Recognition of this exception pro tanto better serves the objects of com-
petitive bidding than servile adherence to the letter of a statute.
CoNTRAcTs REQUIRING PATENTED ITEMS
In the absence of a controlling statute, charter, or ordinance requir-
ing the submission of contracts to competitive bidding, public authori-
ties are not precluded from entering into contracts for public work
calling for the use of patented articles.4' But where such requirement
does exist, there is a conflict of authority as to the right to require
articles subject to patents or other legal monopolies in contract specifi-
cations.
The majority, or Michigan rule, as expressed by Chief Justice Cooley
in Hobart v. Detroit,4 is that even where a statute requires competitive
bidding, it is not violated when all the competition is allowed which
the situation permits. A public authority should not be deprived 6f
the right to avail itself of useful inventions and discoveries even though
protected by patents, and when such an authority, in exercising its con-
tractual powers, decides in good faith to contract for the use of patented
articles, no monopoly or abatement in competition is created beyond
what necessarily results from the rights and privileges given the
patentee by the federal government.
Although the earlier cases followed Hobart in its entirety,"4 the ex-
ception soon became riddled with exceptions to the exception. Thus
it was held that patented material could be specified only, where the
owner of the patent does not himself bid upon the contract but-makes
41. See, Hunt v. Fenlon, 313 Mich. 644, 21 N.W.2d 906 (1946); Morton v. Waycross;
173 Ga. 298, 160 S.E. 330 (1931); Philadelphia Co. v. Pittsburgh, 253 Pa. 147, 97 A.
1083 (1916). The rule in federal procurement is in accord with the majority viev.
ASPR § 3.210-1 et 
seq.
42. Dillingham v. Spartansburg, 75 S.C. 549, 56 S.E. 381 (1907).
43. 17 Mich. 246 (1868).
44. Silsby v. Allentown, 153 Pa. 319, 26 A. 246 (1893); Newark v. Bofinel;'37 N.JL.
424, 31 A. 408 (1895).
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an offer to furnish the patented material to all bidders at a stipulated
price. 45 This view was later modified in that the patentee himself was
allowed to bid where, prior to the bidding, he would agree to furnish
the patented material to any contractor at a specified price.46
A more recent line of cases would seem to hold that in order to pro-
vide for patented materials in contract specifications, the public au-
thority must make a finding that such articles are of such exceptional
superiority that it would be injurious to the public interest not to use
them.47
The modern view following the Hobart case seems to be that public
authorities are free to specify patented articles in their contracts, but
they are obliged in good faith to permit the furnishing of other ma-
terial equal to them.4 This is the most salutary of the exceptions to the
Michigan rule in jurisdictions where its applicability has been limited.
Virginia follows the modern view. Thus in Taylor v. County Board,49
it was held that a public authority had a clear right to frame its specifi-
cations to permit it to buy a patented mechanically-stoked furnace as
competition was not impossible on this account, since the mechanical
stoker was made to compete with the hand-stoked type.
The minority, or Wisconsin rule, has been interpreted as stating that
where competitive bidding is required, patented articles cannot be
used.5 This is an unwarranted overstatement of the rationale of the
Wisconsin case, which held that where competitive bidding is required,
contract specifications requiring the use of patented articles are in-
valid, and where there is no general power to otherwise contract, the
contract is void.5' The case was later distinguished on this basis and
limited to its facts. 2
It speaks ill of Wisconsin jurisprudence, then, to note that the rule
45. Burns v. Nashville, 142 Tenn. 541, 221 S.W. 828 (1920).
46. Hoffman v. Muscatine, 212 Ia. 867, 232 N.W. 430 (1930).
47. Smith v. Seattle, 192 Wash. 64, 72 P.2d 588 (1937); Wegmann Realty v. St.
Louis, 329 Mo. 972, 47 S.W.2d 770 (1932); Comley v. Bd. of Purchases, 111 Conn. 147,
149 A. 410 (1930).
48. Kingston Bituminous Co. v. Long Branch, 124 N.J.L. 472, 12 A.2d 237 (1940).
The rule in federal procurement is in accord with this modern view. ASPR § 1.1206-
1 (a).
49. 189 Va. 472, 53 S.E.2d 34 (1949).
50. See, e.g., Lamhorn v. Hutton, 132 Kan. 226, 294 P. 676 (1931); Fineran v
Bitulithic Paving Co., 116 Ky. 495, 76 S.W. 415 (1903).
51. Deanv. harlton, 23 Wis. 590 (1869).
52. Kilvington v. Superior, 83 Wis. 222, 53 N.W. 487 (1892).
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was resurrected in its broad form thirty years later.53 Since that date,
however, Wisconsin has followed the narrow view.
54
The exception for contracts requiring patented items thus enables
public authorities to take advantage of the benefits that derive from the
use of "intellectual property." That our forefathers afforded specific
protection to patents in the federal Constitution attests to the economic
value of these benefits.
CONCLUSION
The problem in this area has been the failure of the courts to recog-
nize these common law exceptions for what they are, and instead resort-
ing to the mumbo-jumbo of statutory construction and such a prolixity
of rationale that confusion is the inevitable result. These exceptions have
arisen from those cases wherein reason has dictated that bidding pro-
cedures conform to the realities of the marketplace, rather than to the
strict letter of a statute. Ratio est legis anirna; mutua legis ratione mutatur
et lex." Thus judicial recognition of these exceptions as common law ex-
ceptions would greatly promote certainty of result in public litigation
and thereby indirectly give the public the protection from fraud and
favoritism that competitive bidding was designed to provide in the first
place.
CyRUs E. PHILLIPS IV
53. Neacy v. Milwaukee, 171 Wis. 311, 176 N.W. 871 (1920).
54. Victoria v. Muscoda, 228 Wis. 445, 279 N.W. 663 (1938).
55. 7 CoEog, INSTrrUTEs 7.
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